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CLIENT OUTREACH 101: SOLICITATION OF ELDERLY




When feisty Clara Peller asked the immortal question "Where's the
beef'?"' she showed us that she was one older person who could not be
taken in by slick hucksterism. But even a brief survey of news reports
indicates that many elderly2 regularly fail to exercise the same healthy
degree of skepticism in their daily transactions. Instead, despite attempts
at government regulation and educational efforts by consumer groups
and the media, a disconcertingly large number fall victim each year to
swindles and consumer fraud, in which they lose hundreds or thousands
of dollars at a time.' Given the apparent vulnerability of the elderly to
high-pressure salesmanship, conscientious attorneys might want to moni-
tor their behavior with the elderly in order to avoid overreaching in their
promotional efforts. This consideration has special significance for elder-
law attorneys who utilize a particular form of client contact-the educa-
tional seminar.
In order to tap into the expanding customer base of elderly clients,
elder-law attorneys frequently sponsor free or low-cost educational semi-
nars4 on topics that might interest the elderly, such as wills and trusts or
1. The late Clara Peller enjoyed her "15 minutes of fame" in 1984 as the star of a
wildly popular series of commercials for Wendy's restaurants. The diminutive retired
beautician, then in her early eighties, was seen driving up to various fast-food establish-
ments, gruffly demanding "Where's the beef?" when presented with puny burgers. The
slogan was even adopted by former Vice President Walter Mondale in his presidential
campaign that year. See Richard Harrington, Clara Peller A Stake in the Beef, Wash.
Post, Mar. 28, 1984, at Bi.
2. For convenience, this Note follows the tradition of defining "elderly" as over the
age of 65. One reason this definition gained wide usage is that it represents the age at
which most people become eligible for many government benefits. Since helping the eld-
erly obtain these benefits forms a large part of the practice of elder law, it makes some
sense to define elderly this way. See generally Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes,
An Aging Population: A Challenge to the Law, 42 Hastings L.J. 683, 683-87 (1991) (dis-
cussing the tradition). Recent legislation introduced in Congress would stiffen penalties
for fraud perpetrated on older Americans. The legislation defines older Americans as
over the age of 55. See Senate Bill Targets Scams Directed at Consumers Over 55, Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1624, at 128 (July 22, 1993).
3. See infra notes 18-40 and accompanying text. A notable real-life exception, seen
recently on 60 Minutes, is an older woman nicknamed "Grambo," who is deployed by the
State of Arizona to investigate consumer problems of the elderly. In the news report,
Grambo conducts "sting" operations on auto mechanics and hearing-aid salesmen. See
60 Minutes Swindle (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 2, 1994).
4. There appears to be no way even to estimate how many lawyers use seminars.
The use of seminars is considered an important business-development tool, however. See
Celia Paul, How Top Rainmakers Achieve Success, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S 1; see also
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entitlement programs.' Generally, a seminar is a useful service that al-
lows lay people to obtain information about their legal rights, and it can
provide a fair representation of the attorney's abilities.' But if, as the
evidence suggests, the elderly really are more susceptible to persuasive
salesmanship, the use of seminars with this group is potentially mislead-
ing or coercive-even when employed by a well-meaning practitioner.
Unfortunately, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct ("Model Rules" or "Rules") offer little guidance for the
attorney who wishes to conduct a promotional seminar. The Model
Rules draw a distinction between advertising and in-person solicitation,
addressing them with separate rules.' The seminar, however, is a curious
hybrid of advertising and in-person solicitation as well as a pure educa-
tional effort not explicitly addressed by the Rules.' The current Rules
are ambiguous enough that an attorney could arguably face sanctions 9
simply for conducting a seminar.
Donna Greene, Lawyers Can Protect Assets of the Aged, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1991, § 12
(Westchester County), at 3 (mentioning seminars for the elderly).
5. A complete exploration of the practice of elder law is beyond the scope of this
Note. In general, while the elderly may require general legal services not specific to age,
such as divorce representation or services in connection with purchasing or selling prop-
erty, the specialty of elder law responds to the unique needs of the elderly related to their
age and financial circumstances.
The lion's share of work clusters around distribution or retention of assets, including
wills, trusts, and related tax consequences, and maximizing eligibility for government
benefits. Lawyers are also needed to plan for incapacity by helping the elderly draw up
powers of attorney, health-care directives, and living wills. See generally Robert Abrams
& Vincent J. Russo, The Phenomenon, Scope and Practice of Elder Law, N.Y. St. B.J.,
Dec. 1991, at 32 (describing specialty and noting expansion); Fawn Fitter, Elder Law
Comes Into Its Own as a Specialty, Boston Bus. J., Apr. 9, 1993, at 16 (same).
6. See Greene, supra note 4, at 3.
7. Advertising is addressed by Rule 7.2, which reads, in pertinent part: "Subject to
the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through public
media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, out-
door advertising, radio or television, or through written or recorded communication."
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.2(a) (1992). In-person solicitation is ad-
dressed by Rule 7.3, which reads, in pertinent part: "A lawyer shall not by in-person or
live telephone contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a significant mo-
tive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain." Model Rules, supra, Rule
7.3(a) (1992).
8. It is not clear why the seminar, a medium of great persuasive power, has received
so little attention, while conduct that appears to be much less harmful is hotly debated-
for example, the publication of specialty certifications. See Peel v. Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990). An informal ethics opinion of the Michi-
gan State Bar Association is apparently the only attempt to apply Rule 7.3 to solicitation
by seminar. See infra notes 238-46 and accompanying text. The likeliest explanation is
that seminars simply got lost in the shuffle of the confusing history of advertising and
solicitation regulations. See infra notes 83-224 and accompanying text.
9. This Note recognizes that the Model Rules have no legal authority. Each state
adopts its own official standards of professional conduct for attorneys, however, usually
based on model codes and rules promulgated by the American Bar Association. The
majority of states have currently adopted a version of the Model Rules. See 2 Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model
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A per se ban on seminars for the elderly would be an easy way to
prevent overreaching but is not necessarily the most appropriate method.
This approach could subject the elderly to stereotyping ° and invites con-
stitutional challenges by attorneys who wish to conduct seminars. Fur-
ther, while a ban would prevent abuses, it would also prevent
information from reaching people who need and want it. The question,
then, is how to structure the rules to prevent abuses without resorting to
outmoded paternalism or free-speech violations. A more moderate ap-
proach would employ consumer-protection principles to set requirements
for attorney-client interactions. An analysis of consumer problems of the
elderly provides a useful model for a coherent scheme of attorney solici-
tation by seminar.
This Note assesses the ethical consequences of solicitation of the eld-
erly by seminar under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and argues that the current Rules do too little to protect the elderly, and
indeed all consumers, from misleading presentations. Part I provides in-
formation on the elderly, their utilization of legal services, and the fac-
tors that indicate a need for special protections for this group. Part II
traces the history of the ethics rules regarding advertising and solicitation
in general, and as they have been applied to seminars. Part III considers
difficulties in applying the current Model Rules to seminars and proposes
a new Model Rule that would eliminate ambiguities and reconcile the
competing needs of attorneys and clients. This Note concludes that the
Rules should explicitly address the status of seminars so that attorneys
will have clear guidance in planning seminars. Further, the special needs
of the elderly justify prophylactic rules to prevent misleading seminar
presentations that might not be necessary or appropriate in other con-
texts. These rules can be structured as rational consumer protection pro-
visions that neither restrict opportunities for attorneys to solicit business
nor curtail consumers' access to information. In fact, they will also pro-
tect all consumers.
Rules of Professional Conduct § AP4:107 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1993) (noting that 35
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Model Rules).
10. Such stereotyping is forbidden in the employment arena, for example, by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 88 Stat. 74
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)), which prohibits
employment decisions based on "stigmatizing stereotypes" about age and ability. See
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993) ("It is the very essence of age
discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer believes that pro-
ductivity and competence decline with old age."). The ADEA, however, is a remedial act
designed to aid a disenfranchised group. Any other provisions designed to help the eld-
erly might also be considered remedial. See Statement of John J. Pickering, Chairman,
ABA Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly (submitted to the Senate Special
Committee on Aging) (concerning consumer fraud and the elderly), Sept. 24, 1992 (on
file with Fordham Law Review) ("[Tihe ABA has long been concerned with equal access
to justice for the disenfranchised, the elderly and the disabled, those members of our
society who are generally least able to protect their own rights."); see also Frolik &
Barnes, supra note 2, at 712-15 (discussing ways to reconcile protectionist policies with
antidiscrimination policies).
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ELDERLY POPULATION
Regulations on attorney advertising must be narrowly tailored to with-
stand First Amendment scrutiny, and drafters must assert a sufficient
state interest as the basis for any restriction imposed."' A regulation
resting on sentimental paternalism cannot survive constitutional scru-
tiny. Therefore, this Part analyzes the problems of the elderly as both
consumers in general and as consumers of legal services in particular to
provide the necessary justification for the proposed Model Rule.
The first section focuses on high-pressure sales tactics and other forms
of deceptive in-person12 selling to the elderly-both one-on-one and at
seminars. An examination of these extreme forms of persuasion-some
of which involve criminal activity-indicates both the magnitude of the
problem and specific practices that cause harm, including how attorney
seminars can capitalize on these factors.1 3 The second section shows
how certain demographic factors explain the high incidence of vulnera-
bility to the practices described in the first section. Taken together, this
supports the validity of state intervention.
A. Consumer Fraud and the Elderly: The Nature of the Game
The sheer size of the elderly population is the first indicator that this
group deserves concern. The elderly comprise a large segment of the
population; there are more than thirty-one million persons over the age
of sixty-five in the United States. 4 Advances in medical care have ex-
11. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1797-99 (1993).
12. Marketers also target the elderly by telephone with "boiler room" phone sales.
Although these pitches do not involve face-to-face contact, the sellers utilize the same
forms of psychological manipulation that in-person sellers use. Sometimes the
telemarketers offer worthless securities or travel bargains. See Robert F. Service, Elud-
ing Swindlers: A Little Vigilance Can Help Elderly Foil Investment Scams, Chi. Trib.,
Aug. 13, 1993, at Ni. Telemarketers may use deceptive names that make them sound
like reputable charities or political groups. See Don't Trust Those "Official" Come-ons
that Hit Mailbox, Seattle Times, Jan. 31, 1993, at K2. The most common telemarketing
scam today appears to be the phony contest, which requires the "winner" to make large
payments to "claim" prizes. Typically announcements arrive in the mail, and the recipi-
ent must call a number to "claim" the "prize." He or she is then persuaded to release a
credit card number to pay the fee, which may be several hundred dollars or even
thousands. See Mail-Originated Scam, Preying on the Elderly, the Gullible, Sacramento
Bee, Sept. 27, 1993 at Cl; Don Bauder, Telemarketing Fraud Targeted by Lawmakers,
Law Enforcers, San Diego Union-Trib., Mar. 28, 1993, at I1. A caller might be told he
won a power boat; instead of the cabin cruiser he envisions, he receives an inflatable raft
with a tiny motor. See Something Fishy, Consumer Rep., Mar. 1994, at 211. The Model
Rules apply the same prohibition to telephone contact and in-person contact. See Model
Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.3.
13. The misconduct discussed here is of the kind that the Supreme Court sought to
restrict in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), the case that forms the
basis for the present prohibition of in-person solicitation. See infra notes 172-84 and
accompanying text.
14. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population,
General Population Characteristics, United States 17 (1992).
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tended life expectancy, so the elderly sector is also growing rapidly; 5
hence the development and expansion of the specialty of elder law. 6 Ap-
proximately 40 percent have middle or upper incomes, which place them
in the group likely to be targeted by elder law attorneys.'
Of course, the majority of the elderly is not affected by consumer fraud
or swindles, nor indeed is the majority of the general population. 8 Nev-
ertheless, when one considers all victims of this type of conduct, a large
proportion of such victims are elderly-at least sixty percent.19 More-
over, law enforcement authorities state that many victims are embar-
rassed to come forward about fraud crimes, so the actual incidence of
fraud may be fifty to ninety percent higher than reported.2°
The variety of reprehensible behavior in the consumer arena knows no
limit, except perhaps for the imaginations of the perpetrators. Three typ-
ical swindles recur most frequently with the elderly:2' the old-time pock-
etbook switch,22 the bank-examiner swindle," and home repair fraud.24
15. See Mortimer J. Goodstein, The Essence of Elder Liaw, N.Y. St. BJ., Sept./Oct.
1993, at 10 ("In 1900, seniors were 3% of the total national census (3.1 million); in 1988
the elderly numbered 12.4% of the population (30.4 million). Projections for the year
2030 indicate that there will be over 66 million elders-almost 25% of the American
population.") (citing 1990 Report of Joyce T. Berry, U.S. Commissioner on Aging).
Some of the increase in the relative size of the aging population also results from lower
current birth rates, so that younger age groups form a smaller proportion of the total
population. See Frolik & Barnes, supra note 2, at 690.
16. See Fitter, supra note 5, at 16.
17. See Robert C. Atchley, Social Forces and Aging: An Introduction to Social Ger-
ontology 33 (5th ed. 1988) (chart indicating distribution of incomes as of 1984, created by
the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging). The elderly poor also have problems in
obtaining legal advice, but these individuals are not likely to be targeted by typical elder-
law attorneys and are beyond the scope of this Note.
18. FBI statistics break down crimes by age of victim, but they tally fraud in a cate-
gory known as "other assaults," which includes several crimes, so it is impossible to come
up with an actual number of elderly victims. See Monroe Friedman, Confidence Swindles
of Older Consumers, 26 J. Consumer Aff. 20, 23 (1992).
19. Evidence must be extrapolated from reports from individual states or metropoli-
tan law enforcement authorities. See id, at 22-23. For example, at one time, the Los
Angeles and San Francisco police departments reported that 90 percent of the bunco
victims in those cities were over 65, and California reported that 70 percent of health
quackery victims in that state were over 65. See Robert J. Smith, Crime Against the
Elderly: Implications for Policy-Makers and Practitioners 10-11 (1979); see also New
York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Crime & the Elderly: 1989 Report 53
(1990) ("While data support is lacking for the assertion that elderly people are victimized
by fraud much more frequently than younger people, other data suggest strongly that the
circumstances of many individual older people make the group of them a good potential-
victim pool for fraud, as a whole.").
20. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 41.
21. See id. at 27.
22. See id. Movie fans may remember that a version of the pocketbook switch, also
known as the pigeon-drop, was depicted in the opening scenes of the hit film "The Sting."
See The Sting (Universal 1973). In this scam, a perpetrator claims to have found a large
sum of money and offers to split it with the victim and another stranger, a confederate
who pretends not to know the first swindler. Somehow the victim is persuaded to hold
the money "for a few days" and to withdraw money from the bank and add it to the pile
to show "good faith." The swindler combines the two batches of money and gives an
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The elderly are also exploited in the sale of funeral packages,25 health
care,26 and leisure activities.27 In some of the worst cases, sinister care-
takers insinuate themselves into the lives of their charges and obtain con-
trol of assets by undue influence.28
Attorneys also take advantage of the elderly. For example, attorneys
may become involved in caretaker schemes by drawing up the papers
that give a caretaker access to client funds.29 In cases like these, it proba-
bly should have been apparent to the attorney that something was im-
proper in the relationship between the elderly person and the caretaker.30
Unscrupulous attorneys also draft wills in which they appear as benefi-
envelope to the victim, who finds later that the envelope has been switched and the envel-
ope he has is filled with newspaper. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 27.
23. This swindle is a variation on the pocketbook switch. Con artists pose as bank
officials or police officers and ask a victim to help them catch a bank teller who has
supposedly embezzled money from the mark's account. They ask the victim to withdraw
money from his account and turn it over to the investigator. Of course, the hapless vic-
tim, who was eager to help, never sees the money-or the investigator-again. See Fried-
man, supra note 18, at 27-28.
24. Typically, a contractor visits the home, offering an inexpensive service-such as
air-conditioning inspection or furnace cleaning-as a loss-leader. After a sales pitch, the
unwary homeowner agrees to purchase replacement equipment at inflated prices. See id.
at 28. This conduct is not always a crime; it is "not illegal to charge outrageous prices."
Hiawatha Bray, A Real Steal: Con Artists Set Their Sights on Senior Citizens, Chi. Trib.,
Apr. 20, 1993, at Cl.
25. See Smith, supra note 19, at 11; Elizabeth Elmore, Consumer Fraud and the Eld-
erly, in David Lester, The Elderly Victim of Crime 34 (1981).
26. See Elmore, supra note 25, at 32-33. Deceptive hearing-aid sales practices are still
prevalent despite longstanding federal regulation. See Karl Vick, Senate Panel Hears
Hearing Aid Scams, St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 16, 1993, at IA (reporting investigation
by the American Association of Retired Persons); 60 Minutes, supra note 3.
27. The classic example is the coercive sale of extended contracts for dance lessons.
See Craig Pittman, Dances Confront Scams on Elderly, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 20,
1993, at NP I (detailing senior center's plan to sponsor dances as an alternative to expen-
sive studios). There are a number of reported cases involving dance lessons. See, e.g.,
Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. 1980). In this astonishing case, the plaintiff, a
widow of undisclosed age, purchased more than $29,000 worth of dance lessons from
flattering young male instructors. Upon her refusal to "upgrade" to a $49,000 contract
or to add a $9,000 contract, the "affections" of these instructors were withdrawn; one
instructor stepped on plaintiff's toe, disabling her for eleven weeks. Surprisingly, she
returned to the studio to resume her lessons. The same instructor twirled plaintiff in the
air, and she sustained two broken ribs. Plaintiff received treble damages.
28. See Lynn Paquin, Gait Puts Spotlight on Abuse of Elderly, Sacramento Bee, July
22, 1993, at N1. (noting program to recruit utility workers and mail carriers to be on the
alert for a sudden change in habits, such as unpaid bills, that indicates that a caretaker
may have improperly gained access to funds); see also Lori Baker, Seminars Aim to Stop
Con Artists: Sun Cities Called Prime Fraud Spot, Ariz. Republic/Phoenix Gazette, July
16, 1993, at I (reporting case in which a caregiver demanded that a client pay her $5
every time she needed help getting out of her wheelchair to go to the bathroom and
another case in which two men set up a drug laboratory in a widow's garage).
29. See, e.g., Gerard O'Neill, Care Worker Charged With Bilking Woman, 91, Boston
Globe, Nov. 22, 1992, at 1 (questioning role of attorney in drawing up documents that
allowed caretaker to obtain $30,000).
30. See id.
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ciaries31 or may "churn" 32 client accounts for extra fees for services of
dubious necessity.33
Most relevant to the present inquiry is the appearance of a mushroom-
ing number of businesses that target the elderly for some of the same
services elder-law attorneys provide. Typically, attorneys are peripher-
ally involved in carrying out these businesses; often these companies op-
erate by making sales at seminars.34 The basic setup of these schemes is
as follows: Some of the companies use names that create confusion with
reputable senior-citizens' organizations or social-welfare agencies. 35 The
sellers, who are not attorneys, stir up the attendees' fears of high taxes or
the high cost and extreme inconvenience of probate proceedings. 36 This
information is misleading in many cases, because, for example, probate is
not expensive or lengthy in every state.3 ' The speakers then describe
how living trusts can help the attendees' heirs avoid all the difficulties of
probate.38 The sellers then contract with the elderly clients to set up
living trusts, take down financial information, and draw up the docu-
ments.3 9 Later, attorneys at another site quickly review and complete the
documents without consulting with the clients, sometimes making nu-
merous errors.' Finally, the sellers often do not advise the clients of
various legal rights, such as state laws that give them three days to re-
scind the contracts.41
As part of an ongoing national effort, state attorneys general are inves-
tigating and prosecuting cases involving these companies under state
31. Most states prohibit bequests to attorney drafters by common law or statute. See.
eg., In re Putnam's Will, 177 N.E. 399 (N.Y. 1931) (stating New York rule that a be-
quest to a drafting attorney raises a presumption of undue influence); Eric Bailey &
Davan Maharaj, Lawyers' Gift Limit Bill Okd, L.A. Times, Feb. 26, 1993, at BI (pointing
out that at least 36 states prohibit bequests to attorney drafters by statute). Yet the prac-
tice has not been totally eradicated. For example, in Orange County, California, last
year, one attorney allegedly stood to receive millions of dollars from current clients' es-
tates and had received money from estates in the past, despite a long-standing California
Supreme Court holding that restricted bequests to attorney-drafters. In the aftermath of
the discovery, state probate investigators found other attorneys who engaged in this prac-
tice. This incident prompted the California legislature to pass a law forbidding bequests
to attorney drafters. See idl
32. In the securities industry, churning is the practice of a broker's authorizing exces-
sive trades in a client's account in order to generate commissions. This practice is consid-
ered a violation of federal securities law. See Black's Law Dictionary 242 (6th ed. 1990).
33. See Bailey & Maharaj, supra note 31, at B1 (discussing attorneys who drain client
accounts by charging conservator fees). Some elderly clients may also visit attorneys
frequently out of loneliness, asking for minor changes in their wills.
34. See Lori A. Stiegel et al., On Guard Against Living Trusts Scams, Elder L.F.,
May/June 1993, at 1.
35. See aL at 6.
36. See Lori A. Stiegel et al., Scams in the Marketing and Sale of Living Trusts A
New Fraud for the 1990s, 26 Clearinghouse Rev. 609, 610 (1992).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id at 611.




consumer-protection acts and also unifying to educate consumers. 42 Dis-
cipline for the attorneys involved is another matter, however. State con-
sumer protection acts usually exempt professionals, such as physicians
and lawyers, from their operation.43 Some state bars have disciplined the
attorneys involved under their respective state professional ethics codes
for aiding nonlawyers in the unauthorized practice of law.44 It is un-
likely that ethics rules regarding solicitation, advertising, and misleading
communications could apply, however, because the attorneys themselves
did not do the selling, nor were they using the company salesmen as their
agents to gain clients.45 It is easy to imagine, however, how an attorney-
conducted seminar could raise the concerns implicated by the rules on
solicitation and advertising.
For example, the presentation may overstate the need for a particular
service by playing on the attendees' fears of depleting their assets and
falling into poverty. 46 If the attorney can present the seminar in conjunc-
tion with a retirees' group or other organization, it may lend a misleading
appearance of the group's endorsement, especially if the group initiates
the speaking engagement.47 The force of the attorney's personality may
create an unwarranted impression of competence. 48 Or worse, the attor-
ney may be using sexual attractiveness or personal charisma to win cli-
ents.49 The length of the seminar and the fact that it is free or low cost
may also induce a feeling of indebtedness to the attorney. It seems clear
that many elderly consumers would be susceptible to seminar salesman-
ship. It remains to find out why.
42. See Stiegel et al., supra note 34, at 1, 6.
43. See Stephen Gardner & Albert N. Sheldon, See Dick and Jane Sue: A Primer on
State Consumer Protection Laws, 739 A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study 253, 261 (1992).
44. See Stiegel et al., supra note 34, at 6.
45. Employing an agent to recruit clients would be a violation of Rule 7.2(c), which
states: "A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the
lawyer's services." Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.2(c).
46. See, e.g., supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (describing technique of sell-
ing living trusts by overstating expenses of probate).
47. See supra text accompanying note 35. One article advises attorneys to rent a
room at a university, charity headquarters, or hospital to give the impression of another
organization's endorsement. See Jay G. Foonberg, How a Nonlawyer Can Plan and Exe-
cute Firm Seminars as a Means of Getting and Keeping Clients, Law Prac. Mgmt., Jan./
Feb.1993, at 40 (the article envisions lawyer presentations but tells how non-lawyer staff
can help the attorney save time by organizing the seminar). Creating an appearance of a
group's endorsement would violate Model Rule 7.1, which prohibits misleading commu-
nications. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.1.
48. The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated the notion that attorneys' training
in advocacy makes regulation of in-person attorney solicitation constitutional. See Eden-
field v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1972, 1802-03 (1993).
49. When asked whether his youth was a barrier to working with elder-law clients,
one attorney stated that men were sometimes doubtful, but that "he was a hit with the
ladies at the seminars." See Linda Lynwander, Advising the Elderly on Health Costs,
N.Y. Times, June 24, 1990, § 12 (New Jersey), at 3. While this attorney appears to be
taking only unwitting advantage of attractiveness, this remark uncomfortably recalls the
behavior of the unscrupulous dance instructors. See supra note 27.
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B. The Demographics of Isolation. Why the Elderly Are More Likely
to Be Guileless Consumers
Despite medical advances, the elderly do suffer higher rates than the
population at large from chronic diseases and other conditions that di-
minish mental and physical capacity.50 For this reason, one might expect
experts to ascribe the vulnerability of the elderly to consumer fraud to
reduced abilities, particularly mental abilities. This is not the case,
though. In fact, the very people who are most likely to be victimized are
in the younger group of elderly,5' who are most active and mentally en-
gaged and defy traditional stereotypes of the elderly."
Instead, the most significant factors cited are social in nature: Despite
a fair measure of financial security, many of the middle-class elderly lack
certain kinds of experience expected of property owners and others of
similar means. As a result, many of the middle-class elderly are, in es-
sence, disenfranchised by a lack of information and support that could
help them make better decisions; other demographics make the elderly
more available to those who would take advantage of them. Finally,
swindlers are simply very skillful at exercising this advantage. 53
One relevant factor is the difference in male and female life expec-
tancy. Women outnumber men by a wide margin in the elderly popula-
tion, a margin that increases sharply with age. 4 Many of these women
have had less experience with financial affairs.55 Their lack of experience
may disadvantage them in their dealings with lawyers and others.
The living arrangements of the elderly place them at a further disad-
vantage. Many of the elderly are widowed and therefore live alone.56 A
fair number also live at some distance from children and other rela-
tives.57 Living alone has two untoward consequences for these people.
First, those who live alone may crave social contact, making it likelier
that they will respond to a friendly sales pitch.58 Second, the person who
50. See Frolik & Barnes, supra note 2, at 683-4.
51. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 23.
52. See Robert C. Atchley, Social Forces and Aging: An Introduction to Social Ger-
ontology 285 (6th ed. 1991). Loss of physical capacity may have some effect, however, in
relation to the social factors detailed here. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
53. See Elmore, supra note 25, at 32-33 (1981) (listing isolation, loneliness, and lack
of family support as relevant factors); Friedman, supra note 18, at 23.
54. Women outnumber men by about a 5 to 4 ratio in the 65- to-69-year-old age
group; the margin increases steadily to almost 2 to 1 in the 80 to 84 year old group and to
about 2§ to 1 in the over-85 group. See Bureau of the Census, supra note 14, at 17.
55. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 28, at 1 (reporting numerous cases of vulnerability
among widows whose spouses previously took care of family finances); Paquin, supra
note 28, at N1 (same). Of course, today's generation of young working women is less
likely to suffer this disability in later life.
56. About 12 percent of men over 65 live alone and about one third of women. See
Frolik & Barnes, supra note 2, at 701. While this is not a majority, it is a large enough
number to cause concern.
57. See id. at 703.
58. See Bill Coats, When Others Aren't Around, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 9, 1993,
at 1; Elmore, supra note 25, at 32-33.
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lives alone has no one to consult with before entering into a questionable
transaction. The person fortunate enough to survive into old age in the
company of a spouse can be thrust suddenly into single status by sudden
illness or death of a spouse. In these cases, whatever disadvantage is
encountered because of living alone may be exacerbated by overwhelm-
ing grief or fear of impoverishment, which may cloud the surviving
spouse's judgment. 9 Funeral directors can prey on clients in this state
and sell them high-priced funeral services." Elder-law attorneys must be
conscious of similar possibilities in counseling a client whose spouse is
suddenly incapacitated and who faces high long-term-care expenses.
Experts also say that simple availability contributes to the victimiza-
tion of the elderly. The elderly have had a lifetime to accumulate assets,
so they make better targets for swindlers. 61 Their easy availability is en-
hanced when they cluster in retirement communities-these communi-
ties attract legions of those who wish to perpetrate frauds. 62 This
tendency may be more apparent in states such as California, Florida, and
Arizona, which have higher concentrations of retirees because of their
pleasant climates.63
Physical incapacity has some effect, in that it may make a person fear-
ful of questioning a salesperson, or it may diminish the elderly person's
ability to investigate a seller's actions, particularly when the person lives
alone and the sellers work in teams. 4
Finally, studies of sales techniques provide insight into how people re-
spond to manipulative behavior. 65 No one-of any age--is immune to
59. See Elmore, supra note 25, at 33.
60. See id. at 33. The Federal Trade Commission enacted regulations to reduce de-
ceptive selling in the funeral industry in the 1980s. See Fred S. McChesney, Consumer
Ignorance and Consumer Protection Law: Empirical Evidence from the FTC Funeral
Rule, 7 J. L. & Pol. 1, 4 (1990).
61. See Elmore, supra note 25, at 33.
62. See Davan Maharaj, O.C. Retirement Centers Are Swindlers' Paradise, L.A.
Times, Nov. 3, 1991, at Al (depicting Leisure World, an Orange County, California,
retirement community, as "besieged" by the unscrupulous and quoting Orange County
Superior Court Judge James A. Jackman, "I sometimes think of Leisure World as a pool
of small fish with the sharks feeding and circling around the perimeters."). Ironically,
however, congregating in retirement communities can offer protection to the elderly. Re-
tirement village social workers distribute flyers and counsel residents to be wary of scams.
See Paquin, supra note 28, at NI. Single residents in a retirement community will also be
able to discuss problems with their neighbors, and their neighbors may watch out for
their well-being. See id.
63. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1990, Census of Population
and Housing, Summary Population and Housing Characteristics, United States 1-2
(1992) (table of population by age and state).
64. Some people with impaired mobility may be afraid to question a salesperson, or
they may be unable to. Monroe Friedman describes how home repair salespeople often
work in teams. One member talks to the older person on the first floor of the home while
the confederate conducts "inspections" upstairs. The older person with impaired mobil-
ity is unable to follow the inspector upstairs and check on his activities. See Friedman,
supra note 18, at 23, 33-35; Telephone Interview with Monroe Friedman (Jan. 17, 1994).
65. See Harry M. Brittenham et al., Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empiri-
cal Study, 16 UCLA L. Rev. 885 (1969). The Supreme Court referred to this project in
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these tactics.66 A typical response is to give in to a sales pitch just to get
rid of the salesperson.67 In addition, salespeople take advantage of buy-
ers' loneliness6" and feed on people's fears.6 9 Sales professionals are skill-
ful at making the most of a buyer's uncertainties, utilizing prepared
scripts to counter standard objections.7 °
Unfortunately, the seminar format allows an attorney to employ some
or all of the sales techniques listed above.71 Seminars may gain addi-
tional power as a sales tool because the elderly are relatively uninformed
about attorneys and the law, despite outreach by social service organiza-
tions and senior citizens' groups. For example, many elderly people fail
to seek legal counsel because they are unaware that an attorney can help
them with some typical problems, such as failure to obtain a medical
insurance reimbursement. 72  Other prospective clients avoid attorneys
because they fear high fees.73 Finally, many of those who are aware that
they need a lawyer and are willing to pay for legal services still find it
difficult to choose an attorney.74 The middle-class elderly may have had
little experience dealing with lawyers 75 so they may not have a personal
attorney. Word-of-mouth recommendation, favored as an alternative
source of information, may be unavailable because friends and family
Obralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 n.23 (1978), when it considered
whether to allow restrictions on in-person solicitation by attorneys.
66. Any reader can likely recall being persuaded by a salesperson to buy an unflatter-
ing dress or badly fitting shoes, for example. Sometimes we do this because we are too
polite to say no or feel guilty about taking up the salesperson's time. Or we may be too
embarrassed to say we can't afford something, so we buy it anyway. The elderly victim
may even be aware that something is amiss while a swindle is going on but feel "power-
less" to stop it. Some experts, however, say that the social mores of the time when to-
day's elderly grew up give them one extra disadvantage: it makes them more willing to
trust people. This is often echoed by victims of scams. See Bray, supra note 24; Kathe-
rine Shaver, They Perpetrate Not Investigate, St. Petersburg Times, July 10, 1993, at 2;
Gene Thorpe, Helpline, Atlanta Const., Oct. 11, 1993, at El 1.
67. See Brittenham et al., supra note 65, at 895-925 (noting numerous techniques,
including "getting inside the door" and making a "nuisance" of oneself); Friedman, supra
note 18, at 33-35 (describing a range of techniques from "friendly persuasion" to
"intimidation").
68. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
69. See Brittenham et al., supra note 65, at 902-06 (noting encyclopedia sales tech-
nique of preying on father's fear of children being uneducated).
70. See id.
71. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
72. See Wayne Moore, Improving the Delivery of Legal Services for the Elderly: A
Comprehensive Approach, 41 Emory L.J. 805, 811 (1992); see also Nancy Coleman, The
Delivery of Legal Assistance to the Elderly in the United States, in An Aging World: Di-
lemmas and Challenges for Law and Social Policy 463, 464 (John M. Eekelaar & David
Pearl eds. 1989).
73. See Russell G. Pearce et al., Project, An Assessement of Alternative Strategies for
Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 Yale L.J., 122, 132-35 (1980).
74. See iL Providing accurate information about attorney abilities is probably the
most difficult problem the bar faces in this area. See Linda Morton, Finding a Suitable
Lawyer Why Consumers Can't Always Get What They Want and What the Legal Profes-
sion Should Do About It, 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 283, 287-89 (1992).
75. See Barlow F. Christensen, Bringing Lawyers and Clients Together 8-9 (1968).
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also have limited experience with lawyers.76
Other information sources, such as bar association referral services,
provide callers with lists of names but in most cases do not provide con-
sumers with the price and quality information they need to make wise
choices. 77 A consumer who wishes to evaluate the listed attorneys per-
sonally, with in-office consultations, may face high costs or, at the least,
inconvenience.78 In light of this fact, a free seminar stands out as an
attractive alternative source of information and gives the attorney an
advantage.
In addition, even if more or better information were available about
attorneys, it is doubtful that the bar could rely on it to counterbalance
overreaching at seminar presentations. For example, widespread dissem-
ination of information about consumer fraud 79 fails to reach every con-
sumer and therefore does not come close to eradicating it. It thus seems
necessary to require attorneys to counter the disadvantage themselves by
conducting seminars in an ethical manner.
When it comes to misconduct involving lawyers, some bar associations
have stepped forward to undo the damage. For example, after a recent
scandal in Orange County, California, involving an attorney beneficiary
of a will he had drafted, 0 the local bar association enlisted attorneys to
conduct seminars at local retirement communities s.8  These attorneys
pledged not to accept any fees or clients from the audiences.8 2
Nevertheless, many attorneys wish to conduct elder-law seminars for
the primary purpose of attracting clients. The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct should provide attorneys with the guidance they need to
conduct seminars ethically.
76. See id. at 9. Wayne Moore points out that 89% of the elderly who actually use
lawyers obtain them as a result of word-of-mouth recommendation. See Moore, supra
note 72, at 826. This is reconcilable with the idea that the elderly have difficulty ob-
taining lawyers by word-of-mouth recommendation. Even if a great percentage of people
who do obtain legal advice learn of their attorney through word of mouth, a large group
of those who fail to use attorneys could still be underserved because they have no access
to such recommendations.
77. See Moore, supra note 72, at 826-27; Morton, supra note 72, at 287-89.
78. See Pearce et al., supra note 73, at 150.
79. Workers at retirement communities pass out flyers warning of the latest scams.
See Paquin, supra note 28, at Ni; see also Baker, supra note 28, at 1. Police departments
pass on information to news organizations, which report scams heavily in newspapers
and on television as a service to the audience. For example, in 1993, United States news-
papers featured 18 articles on bank examiner scams and the elderly, 39 articles on home
repair fraud and the elderly, and 96 articles on telemarketing fraud and the elderly.
Search of LEXIS, News library, Papers file (April 8, 1994). Consumer fraud reporting is
now a ratings-boosting staple of local TV news reporting and network TV newsmagazine
programs.
80. See supra note 30.
81. See Davan Maharaj, Lawyers to Aid Elderly in Public Service Bid, L.A. Times,




II. SEMINARS UNDER THE CURRENT MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
In order to decide how to structure rules for seminar presentations, it
is necessary to review the development of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct regarding advertising and solicitation. The first part of
this section explores the early history of the legal profession, when law-
yers were largely restricted from advertising and soliciting. The second
part examines how the formal rules changed after the Supreme Court
acknowledged constitutional protection for attorney advertising. This
background is instructive because current rules and recent court deci-
sions retain vestiges of abandoned rules and traditions.
A. The Prohibition of Publicity
Wide use of seminars as a promotional tool is a relatively recent devel-
opment, dating back only to 1977, when the Supreme Court struck down
state restrictions on attorney advertising.83 Earlier, public speaking by
attorneys was restricted if it encompassed any intent to garner business,
or even if business would result incidentally."4 This restriction derived
from a general prohibition of advertising and solicitation.
Prohibitions of advertising and solicitation have a long history. 5 For
centuries, solicitation was prohibited as a crime, a tradition stemming
from ancient perceptions of lawsuits as evil. 6 The profession did not
formally ban advertising, however. A ban would have been unnecessary
because the fraternal brotherhood of attorneys who trained at the Eng-
lish Inns of Court and early American attorneys who had studied in Eng-
land believed advertising was unseemly and refrained from it."'
In the United States of the nineteenth century, the legal profession
expanded a great deal.88 Many attorneys, including Abraham Lincoln,
utilized advertising to build their practices.8 9 Much of the expansion
came from an influx of immigrants, however, and lawyering was no
longer an elite bastion of the upper class.9 Concerned with a lowering of
status because of the invasion of "undesirables," bar leaders banded to-
83. See Fred S. Steingold, How to Use Seminars to Attract Clients, Legal Econ., Mar./
Apr. 1985, at 64, 66.
84. See infra notes 89-129 and accompanying text.
85. A full understanding of the rules on advertising and solicitation requires an in-
quiry into the history of the legal profession before the first Canons of Professional Re-
sponsibility and is beyond the scope of this Note. For an overview, see Louise L Hill,
Solicitation by Lawyers Piercing the First Amendment Veil, 42 Me. L. Rev. 369, 370-388
(1991).
86. See id at 374.
87. See id at 376-78.
88. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modem
America 40-41 (1976).
89. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A
Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1084, 1085 (1983).
90. See Auerbach, supra note 88, at 40-41.
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gether to stave off a further erosion in status.91 This movement
culminated in the adoption of the first ABA Canons of Ethics, in 1908.92
The states quickly adopted the Canons, and they remained in effect with
various amendments for a number of years. 93 The Canons included a
general prohibition on advertising and publicity in Canon 27.94 Canon
28 prohibited solicitation, "directly or through agents," for "stirring up
litigation." '9 5
Ironically, attorneys were never prohibited from undertaking certain
forms of so-called "soft-sell," or indirect, solicitation, such as joining the
country club or becoming active in civic affairs to make useful contacts.
96
91. See id. at 40-41.
92. See Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics 24-25 (1953).
93. See Hill, supra note 85, at 382.
94. The original text of Canon 27 reads:
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young law-
yer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-mer-
ited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or
circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or
local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solici-
tation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communica-
tions, or interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is
equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any
kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure
the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships
or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for busi-
ness by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged, or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer's
positions, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone
of our high calling, and are intolerable.
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 27 (1908).
95. The original text of Canon 28 reads:
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except
in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at
common law.
It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and
inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to
breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those
having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to
employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or
indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office,
or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital at-
tachds or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested
friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the igno-
rant or others, to seek his professional services...
Canons of Ethics, supra note 94, Canon 28 (1908).
This is an early formal prohibition of "ambulance chasing." The two roots of this
prohibition are apparent from the language of this Canon. The first part implies that
stirring up litigation is simply an evil itself. Language in the last few sentences refers to
the evil of "influencing the criminal, the sick and injured, the ignorant or others. . ."-in
other words, overreaching with people without bargaining power.
96. Such behavior was actually encouraged. See, e.g., New Lawyers Comm., Section
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In fact, this method of client outreach was employed most effectively by
the very attorneys who would be likeliest to scorn advertising.97 Com-
mentators portrayed this double standard as an elitist restriction aimed
at excluding smaller-firm attorneys from the profession, 98 and history
lends credence to this criticism.9 9 Henry Drinker, a leading authority on
legal ethics of the mid-twentieth century, " dismissed these objections in
his noted treatise.' 0 ' Essentially, Drinker reiterated traditional notions
of professionalism and duty: "Where publicity is the normal byproduct
of able and effective service, whether of a professional or non-profes-
sional character, this is a kind of 'advertisement' which is entirely right
and proper."'0 2 He distinguished this mode of promotion from any effort
to seek by "artificial stimulus the publicity normally resulting from what
[the attorney] does."' 10 3
Although speaking at seminars could be considered "soft sell," as it
of General Practice, ABA, How to Find the Courthouse: A Primer for the General Prac-
tice of Law for Law Students and Graduates 40 (1978) ("[T]he sole practitioner [should]
be highly visible in the community; he or she must be a joiner, and travel in as many
circles as possible. The more exposure the lawyer has to the public, the more people he
will be able to meet; if he impresses them with his legal abilities, he is surely to obtain
business from some of them."); Harold P. Seligson, Building a Practice 6 (rev. 1955)
("Seek to take part in group activities .... If you are an effective speaker these are
precious opportunities for winning clients."). One early author imposes a quaint aura of
virtuousness on this process, however. See Julius H. Cohen, The Law: Business or Pro-
fession? 198 (1924) (advising new practitioners to serve on legislative committees and the
like but to do so unselfishly: "[The young lawyer must] put his ideals above his profit.
He must entirely and at once dismiss from his mind the thought that such association will
bring business. It will not. It will beget confidence .... ").
97. See Christensen supra note 75, at 24-27 (discussing competitive advantages en-
joyed by traditional large firms before restrictions on advertising were lifted).
98. See Drinker, supra note 92, at 218.
One of the most frequent objections to Canon 27 is that it interferes only with
the little fellows, precluding them from making themselves known to prospec-
tive clients by advertising and solicitation, while the big ones not only are con-
stantly in the public eye, but by means of their membership in clubs and their
prominent participation in Community Chests and in the management of hospi-
tals, colleges, etc., are enabled to meet and become intimate with the leaders in
business as potential clients.
Id.
Justice Marshall reiterated this contention in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 475 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring). Any restriction on seminars will affect elder-
law attorneys, who largely operate in small firms or solo practices. See, eg., Wendy
Bourland, Business Booms for Practice of 'Elder Law, Business Dateline, Miami Rev.,
Apr. 2, 1993, at A10 (reporting predominance of small-firm practitioners of elder law in
South Florida).
99. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
100. Drinker was chairman of the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances of the American Bar Association. See Drinker, supra note 92, at iii (title
page).





fulfills a civic duty to educate the public about the law,'" the rulemakers
did not see it that way.' In a 1928 addition to the Canons, Canon 40,
rulemakers allowed lawyers to provide information to the public, by an-
swering reader inquiries in a newspaper column.10 6 The basic rule of
Canon 27 continued to control, however; thus the second clause of Ca-
non 40 forbade giving individualized advice or accepting employment
arising out of such activities. 0 7
Drinker disapproved of even this relatively narrow area of permissive-
ness regarding attorney contacts with the public. He cautioned attorneys
to be wary lest their participation cause them to run afoul of other rules.
For example, he suggested that writing a newspaper column might easily
drift into improper advertisement; further, the attorney risked giving
legal advice without proper background information and fostering the
unauthorized practice of law by the publisher of the column.0"
Drinker conceded that, by analogy, Canon 40 might permit an attor-
ney to appear on a radio or television broadcast to answer audience ques-
tions'0 9 but pointed out that the same risks of violating other Canons
applied." 0 Although a seminar might be analogous to a newspaper col-
umn or television broadcast, it is actually a more direct form of solicita-
tion, because of the in-person contact involved. Therefore, while Drinker
never addressed the subject, it is likely he would have disapproved of the
seminar as an "artificial stimulus" of business or publicity."'
Courts evaluating attorney conduct under state versions of these Ca-
nons 12 scrutinized a lawyer's publicity to ascertain whether the attorney
had sought the exposure. In some cases, merely acquiescing to the ap-
pearance of one's name in the newspaper could earn sanctions.
104. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility calls for lawyers to participate in
such educational efforts. EC 2-1 of the Model Code states:
The need of members of the public for legal services is met only if they recog-
nize their legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking assistance, and
are able to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel. Hence, important
functions of the legal profession are to educate laymen to recognize their legal
problems, to facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawayers, and to
assist in making legal services fully available.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-1 (1969).
105. The Canons did not call upon attorneys to educate the public. See Drinker, supra
note 92, at app. C 309-25, for the text of the Canons in effect at that time.
106. Canon 40 reads: "A lawyer may with propriety write articles for publications in
which he gives information upon the law; but he should not accept employment from
such publications to advise inquirers in respect to their individual rights." Canons of
Ethics, supra note 94, Canon 40 (1928).
107. See id.
108. See Drinker, supra note 92, at 263.
109. See id. at 264.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 218.
112. Courts evaluated lawyers' conduct under the authority of whatever version of the
Canons was adopted by that particular state. See supra note 9.
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In 1951, in In re L.R.,I' 3 a New Jersey attorney was suspended from
practice for one month for, among other things, getting his name in the
paper. " 4 An article in the local newspaper discussed the attorney's
birthday, his many accomplishments despite his young age, and his suc-
cessful law practice/real estate/insurance business." 5 Since there was
evidence that the attorney had paid the newspaper to print the article,
the court found that he had violated Canon 27's prohibition on self-lau-
dation. " 6 Similarly, in In re Connelly," 7 twelve years later, a New York
court upheld the censure of law firm members who had "cooperated in
the preparation, and acquiesced in the publication of [a Life magazine]
article entitled 'Behind the Scenes Tour of Today's Legal
Labyrinths[.]' "118
In the same year, in Florida ex rel the Florida Bar v. Nichols,'"' the
state bar had disciplined an attorney who was quoted in a local newspa-
per report about his new office building. 2 The attorney had proudly
commented that he could not have constructed the building if not for his
successful law practice.)2 ' The bar association also had disciplined the
attorney for lecturing to other lawyers on trial strategies at events organ-
ized by the bar association.' 22 Here, however, the court reversed both
penalties. 2  Although a vigorous dissent argued that the attorney
should have refused to cooperate with the newspaper, the court held that
the attorney had only responded to the reporter's questions and had not
sought the publicity.' 4 The court also found the trial-strategy lectures
permissible on the same grounds-that the organizations in question had
sought him out. The court also found admirable his efforts to educate
other members of the profession. 25
Efforts to educate the public, by contrast, met with either of two ap-
proaches during this time period, depending on whether the attorney
could earn fees from the potential clients. In NAACP v. Button,' 26 attor-
neys had addressed groups of NAACP members to advise them of their
legal rights in matters concerning racial segregation.' The Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals had held that the activities violated state laws
113. 81 A.2d 725 (N.J. 1951) (per curiam).
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id at 726.
117. 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (App. Div. 1963).
118. See id. at 128.
119. 151 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1963)
120. See id at 259.
121. See id.
122. See icL at 261.
123. See icL at 262.
124. See id at 260.
125. See id
126, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
127. See id. at 420.
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on solicitation. 28 The original discipline by the bar was apparently part
of a movement to use anti-solicitation rules to stymie unpopular civil
rights litigation.1 9  Implicitly recognizing the motivation behind the
targeting of these attorneys,13 who did not stand to earn fees from the
litigation,' the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
First Amendment freedoms of association and expression of the attor-
neys and clients were paramount.1 32
By contrast, the ABA stated that seminars for potential fee-paying cli-
ents were prohibited publicity. In a 1965 ethics opinion,"' the ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility considered
whether an attorney could conduct seminars for potential fee-paying cli-
ents in employment-related civil rights cases.134 The opinion found that
this type of seminar would be improper under the Canons.1 35 In another
opinion,136 in the same year, the ABA Committee approved prohibition
of attorney participation in seminars unless the seminars had the primary
purpose of educating the public on legal matters. 37
The ABA promulgated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
("Model Code") in 1969, because the Canons began to seem inade-
quate.138 The Code, however, retained much of the Canons' approach to
attorney solicitation and advertising, particularly the restriction on indi-
rect solicitation.' 39 Therefore, it is not surprising that the ABA reaf-
firmed the approach of its 1969 opinion two years later, this time in an
informal opinion concerning a television broadcast about wills and
trusts. 40 These general prohibitions would not stand much longer, how-
128. See id. at 425-26.
129. See id. at 429-30 & n. 12 (noting similar movements in other civil rights contexts).
130. See id. at 430.
131. See id. at 420.
132. See id. at 428-29.
133. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Reponsibility, Informal Op. 809
(1965) (attorney seminars for clients and possible clients).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Reponsibility, Informal Op. 840
(1965) (legal seminars-rules for attorney participation).
137. See id.
138. See Hill, supra note 85, at 382 & n.92 (noting that bar leaders criticized the Ca-
nons as not distinguishing between inspirational and prescriptive provisions).
139. Compare Canons of Ethics, supra note 94, Canon 40 ("A lawyer may with propri-
ety write articles for publications in which he gives information upon the law; but he
should not accept employment from such publications to advise inquirers in respect to
their individual rights.") with Model Code, supra note 104, DR 2-104(A)(2) ("A lawyer
may accept employment that results from his participation in activities designed to edu-
cate laypersons to recognize legal problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel, or to
utilize available legal services if such activities are conducted or sponsored by a qualified
legal assistance organization.") and DR 2-104(A)(4) ("Without affecting his right to ac-
cept employment, a lawyer may speak publicly or write for publication on legal topics so
long as he does not emphasize his own professional experience or reputation and does not
undertake to give individual advice.").
140. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1179
(1971) (lawyer participation in television series on estate planning).
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ever, as a new era of First Amendment jurisprudence began.
B. Constitutional Protection for Attorney Speech
An evolving, expansive view of the First Amendment that applied it to
the states permitted new constitutional protections for attorney
speech.14' Eventually, attorney advertising was protected under the doc-
trine that protected commercial speech. At first, in the 1940s, the
Supreme Court formally denied First Amendment protection to com-
mercial speech: In Valentine v. Chrestensen,142 a promoter docked a sub-
marine in New York City and sought to publicize tours of the vessel.
14 3
A city ordinance forbade distribution of commercial handbills but al-
lowed distribution of protest handbills."4 In an effort to get around the
ordinance, Chrestensen distributed promotional handbills that contained
a message protesting the city policy on the reverse side, and he was re-
strained by the police.141 Ignoring the protest component of Chresten-
sen's communication, the Supreme Court upheld the city's actions and
flatly stated that the "Constitution imposes no... restraint on govern-
ment as respects purely commercial advertising.""
Attorneys' commercial speech eventually gained protection in other
contexts, however. Some courts began to invoke the free speech-political
association rationale of NAACP v. Button 147 to protect attorney commu-
nications of a commercial nature. A 1974 case on seminars, involving
the well-known attorney Melvin Belli, 4 ' is instructive.
In addition to his career as a trial attorney, Belli developed a successful
career on the lecture circuit, speaking on "topics ranging from law and
legal reform to religion, astrology, and J. Edgar Hoover.""' Belli also
conducted events called "Belli Seminars," a series of panel discussions on
the law.'50 Belli received "handsome stipends" for these events and re-
tained an agent to book his appearances.' 5 ' Since the materials used to
promote the seminars referred to Belli's notable achievements in his law
practice, the California State Bar sought to discipline Belli under Rule 2,
the anti-solicitation rule of the states' Rules of Professional Conduct,
based on the Model Code.
152
141. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Com-
mercial Speech, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 747, 759-61 (1993).
142. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
143. See id. at 53.
144. See id, at 53 n. 1.
145. See id. at 53.
146. Id. at 54.
147. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
148. See Belli v. State Bar, 519 P.2d 575 (Cal. 1974).
149. See it. at 578.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See i. at 577-78. (noting that Rule 2 stated "(A] member of the State Bar shall
not solicit professional employment by advertisement or otherwise." Also pertinent was
the part of the Rule that prohibited "Using a newspaper, magazine, radio, television,
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The California Supreme Court distinguished Belli's activities from
those of the tour operator in Valentine v. Chrestensen,15 3 saying that Belli
"sought to discuss serious and oftentimes controversial issues of public
significance."' 54 The court held that because the flyers at issue were pri-
marily directed at promoting Belli's seminars and not his law practice, it
was a constitutionally impermissible infringement on Belli's free speech
rights to forbid the use of the flyers."' 5 The court also held that an inci-
dental motive to increase business for Belli's law practice did not permit
the State Bar to regulate the conduct.'5 6 Only a communication "princi-
pally directed toward this end" could be restricted." 7 This language sug-
gests that the court's holding might have been different if Belli had
engaged in more direct solicitation: for example, had he discussed tort
litigation-a specialty of his-before a group of accident victims. The
case nonetheless represents a shift in thinking about attorney speech in
that the court used First Amendment language in addition to carrying
out the traditional scrutiny of the attorney's intent to garner legal
business.
When the United States Supreme Court considered commercial speech
again, two years after the Belli case, it took a similar approach. In Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,15 s the Court struck down as unconstitutional a state statute forbid-
ding all price advertising of pharmaceuticals. 9 Here the Court ex-
pressly overruled the holding of Valentine v. Chrestensen '60 and
acknowledged the importance to the public of receiving knowledge about
personal business transactions, pointing out that the "consumer's interest
in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not
keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate." '161
The Court articulated a caveat, however, that gives commercial speech
a second-class status. In a footnote, Justice Blackmun pointed out that
books, circulars, pamphlets, or any medium of communication, whether or not for com-
pensation, to advertise the name of the lawyer or his law firm or the fact that he is a
member of the State Bar or the bar of any jurisdiction; [although] nothing herein shall be
deemed to prevent the publication in a customary and appropriate manner of articles,
books, treatises or other writing." Id. at 578 n.1 (quoting California rules).
153. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
154. Belli, 519 P.2d at 580.
155. See id. at 581.
156. See id.
157. Id. The court's assessment of the relative value of the messages is perhaps a bit
unfair to Mr. Chrestensen. What's more, we cannot be so sure that Mr. Belli's primary
motivations were not related to increasing his law practice.
158. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
159. See id. at 770.
160. See id. at 762 ("Our question is whether speech which does 'no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction' lacks all protection. Our answer is that it [does] not.")
(citations omitted).
161. Id. at 763. The Court also noted the public interest in "the free flow of commer-
cial information" in a free-market economy. Id. at 764.
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"[tihere are commonsense differences between speech that does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction'" and other varieties of
speech.162 He added that it would be permissible for states to require
disclaimers and warnings and other means to prevent deception. 163 The
Supreme Court has affirmed this approach in later decisions, and even
narrowed it, making it somewhat easier for a state to restrict commercial
speech than other kinds of speech. 161
Nevertheless, Virginia Pharmacy opened the door to attorney First
Amendment challenges of advertising restrictions. Eventually one of
these cases reached the Supreme Court. Bates v. State Bar 165 ushered in
a sweeping change in the view of attorney advertising. In Bates, lawyers
operated a legal clinic in which they handled only "routine matters,"
such as uncontested divorces and simple personal bankruptcies, advertis-
ing "legal services at very reasonable fees." 16 6 The Arizona rules then in
effect prohibited this type of promotion.' 67
In a lengthy opinion that rejected virtually all the traditional argu-
ments against attorney advertising, 6 ' the Supreme Court stated that
"the conclusion that Arizona's disciplinary rule is violative of the First
Amendment might be said to flow a fortiori from [Virginia Pharmacy].
The disciplinary rule serves to inhibit the free flow of commercial infor-
mation and to keep the public in ignorance."'' 69 The Court expressly
reserved the question of whether states could prohibit in-person solicita-
tion.17 0 But after Bates, states could no longer ban attorney advertising
altogether. Instead, states could draft only rules that would prevent false
or misleading statements or that would satisfy other important state
interests. 171
The next year, 1978, the Supreme Court decided two companion cases
that further defined the parameters of permissible attorney solicitation.
162. See id. at 771-72 n.24.
163. See id.
164. In the first case, the Supreme Court set up a four-part test for evaluating commer-
cial speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). In the next case, the Court held that restrictions on
advertising of casino gambling to residents of Puerto Rico satisfied the Central Hudson
test. This included the fourth part, that the restriction was found to be no more restric-
tive than necessary. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
478 U.S. 328, 340-43 (1986). Most recently, the Court held that the "least-restrictive
means" test need not be satisfied in a regulation of commercial speech. See Board of
Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1989).
165. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
166. See id. at 354.
167. See id. at 356.
168. The objections offered were that advertising had an adverse effect on professional-
ism, that it was inherently misleading, that it would stir up litigation, and that it would
have undesirable economic effects. See id. at 367-81. Further, attorneys argued that the
rules were overbroad. See id. at 380-81.
169. Id. at 365.
170. See id. at 384.
171. See id. at 383-84.
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The first, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 72 addressed in-person solicita-
tion. The Court's opinion invoked the traditional distaste for "ambu-
lance chasing." Ohralik, an Ohio attorney, learned about an auto
accident from an acquaintance. 173 He visited one party, an 18-year-old
girl, in the hospital, where she was in traction, and obtained her consent
for contingency-fee representation. 174 By various subterfuges, including
the use of a hidden tape recorder, he also gained access to the passenger
in the car, another 18-year-old girl, and signed her as a client as well.
Eventually, a fee dispute with the first client brought Ohralik's conduct
to light.175 The Supreme Court of Ohio imposed indefinite suspension
for violations of state anti-solicitation rules. 176
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Ohio Supreme Court's
ruling, rejecting Ohralik's constitutional claim that his solicitation was
indistinguishable from the advertisements permitted by Bates. 177 While
recognizing that "the original motivation behind the ban on solicitation
today might be considered an insufficient justification for its perpetua-
tion,"'171 the Court nonetheless asserted a continuing state interest in
"maintaining high standards among licensed professionals." 179 More im-
portant, the Court took a strong stand on the dangers of overreaching
with vulnerable clients, articulating several perils inherent in personal
solicitation of individuals: the attorney, who is trained in the art of per-
suasion, could more easily exert undue influence; the client might be
pressured to make a quick decision without the opportunity to consult
with others; and the state would find it difficult to police such contacts. 80
The difficulty of preventing these dangers in any way other than a ban
merited a prophylactic rule'8 ' prohibiting "in-person solicitation, for pe-
cuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State
has a right to prevent."18 2
The Court rejected Ohralik's argument that the rule was applied un-
fairly to him, because the state could not prove actual harm to the cli-
ents. 8 3 Without examining whether the clients were harmed, the Court
instead stated that because the ban was a prophylactic one, the state need
not prove actual harm-just that the solicitation took place.' 84
172. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
173. See id. at 449.
174. See id. at 449-50.
175. See id. at 451-52.
176. See id. at 453-54. The anti-solicitation rules in question were rules against recom-
mending oneself and providing unsolicited advice. See id. at 453 n.9.
177. See id. at 455.
178. Id. at 460.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 464-66.
181. See id. at 462.
182. See id. at 445.




On the same day, the Court decided In re Primus, 185 a case that is
reminiscent of NAACP v. Button. 8 6 In Primus, an ACLU attorney ad-
dressed a group of female welfare recipients who had undergone forced
sterilization by the state to advise them of their potential civil rights
claims."3 7 The Supreme Court of South Carolina ignored the attorney's
conduct in addressing the group and instead focused on a letter the attor-
ney had sent to one of the women in the audience, holding that it consti-
tuted impermissible solicitation. 8 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 89
The Court held that the letter did not constitute prohibited in-person
solicitation, but instead constituted permissible conduct flowing from the
associational freedoms enunciated in NAACP v. Button. "°
In reaffirming the holding of NAACP v. Button, the Court emphasized
two factors that would be decisive in determining where to draw the line
between impermissible in-person solicitation and protected political ac-
tion. In Primus, the lawyer came to address the women in response to a
request from a social welfare organization, and she also stood to earn no
fees from the litigation. 9 '
But the impact of the two decisions is not clear. Indeed, in a dissent-
ing opinion in Primus, Justice Rehnquist suggested that the middle
ground between the "ambulance chasing" in Ohralik and the political
action in Primus would be muddy, and he predicted that "the next law-
yer in Ohralik's shoes who is disciplined for similar conduct will come
here cloaked in the prescribed mantle of 'political association' to assure
that insurance companies do not take unfair advantage of policyhold-
ers."192 Rehnquist therefore proposed a standard that focused not on the
motivation of the lawyers but on the nature of their conduct. 93
Justice Marshall also predicted that these holdings would cause confu-
sion.'94 Where Rehnquist remained favorably disposed toward advertis-
ing restrictions, however, Marshall advocated the lifting of regulations
that might "obstruct the distribution of legal services to all those in need
of them."' 95
In the wake of these decisions, the ABA revised the Model Code to
185. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
186. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
187. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 422.
188. See id.
189. See id at 426-32.
190. See id. at 426-32. In dicta the Court suggested that under a literal reading of the
rules then in effect, the attorney could have been disciplined for the group solicitation as
well. The Court indicated that it would not approve such a restriction because the same
associational freedoms were implicated. See i, at 433.
191. See id at 415.
192. Id at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
193. See id at 443.
194. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468-69 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
195. Id at 469.
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remove certain unconstitutional restrictions. 196 As a substitute, rule
drafters attempted to create unassailable bright-line rules to prevent mis-
leading communications. 197 Most notably, the drafters compiled a list of
information permissible in advertisements. 198 Several challenges to such
lists and other provisions reached the Supreme Court, and in all cases the
196. See Hill, supra note 85, at 384 & n.94.
197. See id.
198. The Model Code list read as follows. The current version of the Model Code
retains the same language.
DR 2-101 Publicity
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any form of
public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim.
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by poten-
tial consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to
DR 2-103, the following information in print media distributed or over televi-
sion or radio broadcast in the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer
resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele
resides, provided that the information disclosed by the lawyer in such publica-
tion or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A), and is presented in a dignified
manner:
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates;
addresses and telephone numers;
(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices, a state-
ment that practice is limited to one or more fields of law, or a statement that the
lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of law practice, to the extent
authorized under DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and other scholastic
distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching positions;
(10) Memberships, offices, and committee assignments, in bar associations;
(11) Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
(12) Technical and professional licenses;
(13) Memberships in scientific, technical and professional associations and
societies;
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer participates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Fee for an initial consultation;
(21) Availability upon request of a written schedule of fees and/or an estimate
of the fee to be charged for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106(C), provided that the statement
discloses whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs;
(23) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement discloses that the
specific fee within the range which will be charged will vary depending upon the
particular matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled without
obligation to an estimate of the fee within the range likely to be charged, in
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Court held for the attorneys.199
The most relevant holding in this line of cases was in Shapero v. Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n. 2° Shapero removed direct mail from the prohibited cat-
egory of solicitation and established it as permissible advertising.20'
While acknowledging that these mailings might intrude on vulnerable
targets, the Supreme Court found that direct mail did not raise the dan-
gers present in Ohralik, where the harm resulted from strong in-person
persuasion-the recipient of direct mail contact can simply discard the
letter.20 2 This distinction sharpens the Court's focus on face-to-face con-
tact as the main danger of solicitation, rather than the mere act of ap-
proaching people who have a specific legal problem. 23
In addition to rewriting the Model Code, the ABA issued a new opin-
ion on seminars. Informal Opinion 1489,21 issued in 1982, is only
grudgingly permissive about seminars, however: "Programs should be
motivated by a desire to educate the public to an awareness of legal needs
and to provide information relevant to the selection of the most appropri-
ate counsel rather than to obtain publicity for the particular lawyer. ' 25
print size equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee
information;
(24) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the total fee
charged will depend upon the number of hours which must be devoted to the
particular matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled to with-
out obligation an estimate of the fee likely to be charged, in print size at least
equivalent to the largest print used in setting for the fee information;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of which would not be
misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that the statement discloses that the
quoted fee will be available only to clients whose matters fall into the services
described and that the client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate
of the fee likely to be charged in print size at least equivalent to the largest print
used in setting forth the fee information.
Model Code, supra note 104, DR 2-101 (A)-(B) (1980).
199. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990)
(permitting attorney's advertisement to include his certification by National Board of
Trial Advocacy because it was a bona fide organization, even though it was not recog-
nized by the state for certification of specialties); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982)
(permitting attorney advertisements to use language deviating from bright-line state rule);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (permitting picture of
IUD in advertisement for Dalkon Shield plaintiffs, because not inherently misleading, but
sustaining reprimand for other violations of misleading nature regarding fees).
200. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
201. See id. at 475-78.
202. See id. at 475-76.
203. See id at 479 ("The pitch or style of a letter's type and its inclusion of subjective
predictions of client satisfaction might catch the recipient's attention more than would a
bland statement of purely objective facts in small type. But a truthful and nondeceptive
letter, no matter how big its type and how much it speculates can never 'shou[t] at the
recipient' or 'gras[p] him by the lapels,' ...... as can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face
solicitation. The letter simply presents no comparable risk of overreaching.") (alterations
in original) (citations omitted).




This opinion is poorly reasoned, as it does not address the hybrid na-
ture of the seminar by referring to the principles set forth in Bates,
Ohralik, and Primus, but instead simply restates the traditional prohibi-
tions on seeking publicity, in the same language of the ABA's previous
opinion on seminars.20 6 Also, the rule would be difficult to enforce.
How would a disciplinary body measure the attorney's motivation?
The Model Code and its interpretations are less relevant now than they
were in 1982, however, because the majority of states have adopted some
version of the Model Rules, 20 7 first promulgated in 1983.208 The ABA
adopted the Model Rules in response to criticism that the structure of the
Model Code was too complicated and confusing. 20 9 The Model Rules
are much simpler in form.210 In terms of lawyer advertising and solicita-
tion, Rules 7.2 and 7.3 are most important. Rule 7.2 is essentially the
codification of the Supreme Court's holdings in Bates and its progeny,
while Rule 7.3 is the codification of Ohralik.21 1
The Model Rules removed the Model Code's language about accepting
employment resulting from public speaking and writing, but the legisla-
tive history does not explain why this language was deleted.2" 2 It is im-
possible, therefore, to be sure what the ABA intended with regard to
seminars beyond the guidance provided by its last opinion on seminars,
issued the year before.
Whatever the ABA had in mind about seminars and publicity in 1983,
however, it is clear that no one enforces reticence in self-promotion to-
day. Lawyers boldly seek publicity for their activities (or at least acqui-
esce to it) without censure. 21 3  Practice-development gurus advise
206. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1179
(1971) (lawyer participation in television series on estate planning).
207. See supra note 9.
208. See Hill, supra note 85, at 385.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 386-87. There is no rule concerning solicitation through political activ-
ity, because it is not considered impermissible solicitation under In re Primus. See In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434 (1978).
Model Rule 7.3, however, includes a special provision for solicitation of members of
prepaid legal plans. Model Rule 7.3(d) states:
Notwithstanding the prohibitions in paragraph (a), a lawyer may participate
with a prepaid or group legal service plan operated by an organization not
owned or directed by the lawyer which uses in-person or telephone contact to
solicit memberships or subscriptions for the plan from persons who are not
known to need legal services in a particular matter covered by the plan.
Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.3(d). This creates a limited separate category of per-
missible solicitation of fee-paid work with members of an association.
212. See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, The Legislative History of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Their Development in the ABA House of Dele-
gates 182-88 (1987).
213. Best-selling novelist/attorney Scott Turow freely publicizes his books on national
tours without the kind of censure the state attempted in Belli v. State Bar, 519 P.2d 575
(Cal. 1974), see supra notes 148-57 and acompanying text. See Matthew Gilbert, Scott
Turow: His Word Is Law, Boston Globe, June 15, 1993, at 53. And unlike the attorneys
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attorneys to use seminars to promote their services,21 '4 and attorneys fol-
low their advice gratefully.215 The case of elder-law seminars deserves
reexamination, however, given that some attorneys seem to be unaware
of the potential for abuse of the seminar format.216
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on professional solici-
tation indicates that the Court would be willing to approve regulation of
elder-law seminars and even any seminars for individual, noncorporate
clients. Only last year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of
Ohralik, in a case involving accountants, not attorneys. In Edenfield v.
Fane,2 1 1 an accountant who wished to solicit business clients challenged
a Florida accounting regulation in federal court.21 8 The regulation in
question, mirroring Model Rule 7.3, prohibited in-person solicitation. 1 9
The district court enjoined enforcement of the restriction, and the Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed.22 Citing Ohralik, the State of Florida asserted
that its regulation was constitutional."2!
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit and distinguished
Ohralik on two grounds, stating that "the constitutionality of a ban on
personal solicitation will depend upon the identity of the parties and the
precise circumstances of the solicitation."22 First, because the account-
ant sought to solicit sophisticated corporate clients, the Court found no
danger of overreaching, because these clients were "far less susceptible to
manipulation than the young accident victim in Ohralik." 23 Second, the
Court also pointed out that unlike attorneys, accountants were not
trained in the art of persuasion; therefore, their solicitation efforts did not
present a danger of high pressure or undue influence. 24
This decision demonstrates the Supreme Court's continuing willing-
ness to view in-person attorney solicitation in a special light, amenable to
relatively tight restrictions under certain circumstances. Therefore, the
Court might view the contact of persuasive attorneys with elderly clients
in In re Connelly, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (App. Div. 1963), see supra notes 117-18 and accom-
panying text, the giant law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom cooperated in
the preparation of a recent book-length profile of the firm without earning any discipli-
nary action. See John Taylor, The Grand Acquisitor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1994, § 7
(Book Review), at 26.
214. See Steingold, supra note 83, at 64-65.
215. See Paul, supra note 4, at S1.
216. See, e.g., Foonberg, supra note 47, at 40 (giving advice to create an impression of
endorsement by another organization when conducting seminars).
217. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
218. See id at 1797.
219. Compare id at 1796 ("[A CPA] shall not by any direct, in person, uninvited
solicitation solicit any engagement to perform public accounting services. . .") (citing
former Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 21A-24-002(2)(c) (1992)) with Model Rule 7.3, supra
note 7.
220. See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1797.
221. See id at 1802.
222. Id
223. Id at 1803.
224. See id. at 1802-03.
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as a dangerous mixture and uphold a ban on attorneys' accepting clients
from elder-law seminars.
III. THE MODEL RULES: INADEQUATE GUIDANCE
States may discipline attorneys who conduct misleading or coercive
seminars under existing rules that restrict such advertising. 225 But the
wait-and-see approach does nothing to prevent misconduct. This section
analyzes different ways to do so. The first part discusses two approaches
to applying Model Rule 7.3 to seminars through both literal and liberal
interpretations; the second part proposes a new rule that would work
better in providing guidelines for attorneys who wish to conduct
seminars.
A. Problems in Dealing with Seminars Under the Current Model
Rules
Because attorney seminars are hybrids of advertising and in-person
contact, it is difficult even to decide which Rule should be applied to
them. An attorney seminar cannot be considered ordinary advertising,
as covered by Rule 7.2, because it involves in-person contact. Rule 7.2
permits only print or broadcast communication.226 Further, under In re
Primus,227 an attorney cannot claim the protection of political associa-
tion if he or she intends to earn fees from seminar attendees. 228 The
applicable Rule, then, must be Rule 7.3, because the Rule covers in-per-
son solicitation for pecuniary gain.
1. A Literal Reading
A literal reading of Model Rule 7.3 seems to call for a ban on semi-
nars. The pertinent part of the rule reads: "A lawyer shall not by in-
person or live telephone contact solicit professional employment from a
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior profes-
sional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is
the lawyer's pecuniary gain. "229
Applying the rule line by line: The lawyer is soliciting professional
employment through in-person contact. The lawyer's pecuniary gain is
likely to be a significant motive for holding the seminar. The lawyer
probably has no prior professional or family relationship with the poten-
tial clients. And, finally, the rule does not expressly restrict its applica-
bility to one-on-one solicitation. A court could discipline even a well-
meaning attorney for giving a seminar, because Rule 7.3 is a prophylactic
225. See supra note 9.
226. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.2.
227. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
228. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
229. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.3(a).
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rule that does not depend on intent to mislead or coerce.Y0 This literal
reading of the rule as applied to seminars, however, ignores the rule's
origin in the holding of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,2" which holds
that "a State... may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person,
for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the
State has a right to prevent." '232
When applied to a type of solicitation different from the ambulance
chasing in Ohralik, then, the broad language of Rule 7.3 really requires a
careful analysis of all the factors mentioned in Ohralik-the vulnerability
of the audience and the persuasiveness of the attorney as well as any
mitigating factors23 3 -to see whether the type of solicitation is "likely to
pose dangers." In the case of elder-law seminars, which contain an edu-
cational component and are held in public, one can make a number of
arguments for and against the constitutionality of a ban.
Many of the elderly may be vulnerable to overreaching by attorneys,'
but perhaps less so than the client in Ohralik, who was immobilized after
a significant trauma. Persons attending seminars, by contrast, have to
travel to reach the seminar site, so they are presumably also mobile
enough to leave. Thus, they are not a captive audience in the way the
Ohralik patient was. This factor weighs against a ban.
Ohralik also permits state regulations to prevent intrusive solicita-
tion.235 The solicitation in Ohralik represents the attorney's first contact
with the client,236 and it was considered intrusive by the Court. With a
seminar, however, an initial contact by flyer or advertisement draws the
potential client to attend. Thus, a seminar does not present the same
danger of intrusive solicitation as was present in Ohralik.
The final concerns of the Supreme Court in Ohralik relate to the in-
person nature of the solicitation: the forcefulness of the presentation, the
absence of opportunity to consult with others before accepting represen-
230. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978).
231. See Hill, supra note 85, at 385.
232. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). Some states have adopted ethics rules
based on this language. For example, the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct
expressly expand on Rule 7.3 to prohibit solicitation of vulnerable people. See New
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct Governing the Ethics of the Legal Profession in
New Jersey RPC 7.3(b) (1990), in ABA Comm'n on Advertising, Provisions of State
Codes of Professional Responsibility Governing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation
2-3/NJ91 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1991).
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently applied RPC 7.3(b) to solicitation by mail.
See In re Anis, 599, A.2d 1265, 1270 (1992). The court upheld discipline of an attorney
who had mailed letters to families of victims of the Lockerbie airplane crash shortly after
the tragedy. See id. at 1267. Even though direct-mail attorney advertising is permitted
by Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 473 (1988), the New Jersey court held
that because the mailing was so intrusive under the circumstances, it could be prohibited
under RPC 7.3. See Anis, 599 A.2d at 1270.
233. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 463-64.
234. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
235. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466.
236. See id. at 450.
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tation, and the lack of any reliable method for the bar to monitor the
contacts.237
Despite being a public gathering, the seminar poses these same risks.
Although the seminar is open to all, only interested parties are likely to
attend. Disciplinary officials will not easily be able to attend many semi-
nars; thus attorneys can stage misleading or coercive presentations with
little fear of observation by disinterested parties. There is likely no safety
in numbers for the audience, because virtually all the attendees are pro-
spective clients who may be similarly disadvantaged by a lack of informa-
tion. If all of the attendees are charmed by the presentation, comparing
notes after the program will be of little value to them. These factors,
therefore, weigh in favor of a ban.
In the final balancing, however, one probably cannot justify a total ban
on elder-law seminars based on a literal reading of Rule 7.3: seminars
offer an undeniably valuable educational message; there is some associa-
tional freedom involved; the persons attending are not as vulnerable as
the Ohralik patient; and the members of the audience want to attend the
seminar. These favorable factors probably outweigh the unfavorable
ones relating to the bar's inability to police the presentations.
2. A Liberal Reading
An alternative approach would be to allow seminars but to impose
procedures that are consistent with permitted restrictions on advertising.
A recent ethics opinion from the Michigan State Bar Association at-
tempts to create such a structure to supplement Rule 7.3.238 According
to the opinion, a law firm wished to conduct seminars to reach potential
plaintiffs who had lost money investing with a local brokerage firm.239
Some of the investors were elderly. 2" The attorneys asked whether such
seminars would be proper under Rule 7.3.241
The opinion construes the rule to allow seminars, but, struggling to
impose some structure, grasps at other sources for guidance. The opin-
ion cautions that there must be a cooling-off period after a seminar and
prohibits attorneys from giving individual advice at the seminars.242 The
opinion writers thus dealt with the ambiguity by reading in one protec-
tive measure-the prohibition on giving individual advice-from a disci-
plinary rule that is no longer in effect.2 43 They also supply another-the
237. See id. at 457.
238. See Joanna S. Abramson, Client Solicitation Via Seminar Ok'd, Mich. Law.





243. The suggestion of giving no individual advice recalls DR 2-104(4) of the Model
Code, which states: "Without affecting his right to accept employment, a lawyer may
speak publicly or write for publication on legal topics so long as he does not ... under-
take to give individual advice." Model Code, supra note 104, DR 2-104. It also recalls
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cooling-off period-from general consumer-protection law. 2 " The sug-
gestion of a cooling-off period is problematic, however, because the opin-
ion does not state how long the cooling-off period should last or how it
should operate.24 5
The opinion writers recognized that Ohralik was controUing, 246 but
they did not undertake a detailed analysis of all the factors mentioned by
the Supreme Court. The writers probably should have done so, however,
because some of the potential clients were elderly, although they were
not elder-law clients. Despite its weaknesses, this opinion seems to take
the correct approach. It recognizes that seminars are a valuable contri-
bution to the public interest and seeks merely to impose some structure
that could reduce the risks of overreaching. A new rule that expressly
provides the necessary structure would be helpful.
B. A Third Option: A Proposed Model Rule
This section proposes an addition to the Model Rules to create a satis-
factory structure for attorney seminars. The first part discusses general
policy considerations and constitutionality. The second part proposes
the new Rule and explains it in detail.
1. Background on Advertising Rules
Any proposed new rule for attorney solicitation faces criticism from
those who seek to lift even the restrictions that currently remain in place.
These commentators echo many of the free-market theories that pre-
ceded the lifting of attorney advertising restrictions.
Early supporters of attorney advertising focused on the needs of the
middle-class consumer, who found it difficult to obtain legal services.2 47
One commentator optimistically opined that attorney advertising would
usher in a great wave of information that would eliminate the disadvan-
tages the middle class encountered in hiring attorneys. 248 According to
this theory, free enterprise would increase competition, lower attorney
fees, and ultimately increase access to lawyers.24 9 The market would
eliminate the dangers of misleading advertisements because competition
would drive out any attorney who tried such tactics. 250 Opponents of
regulation also favored freedom to advertise because regulations had an
Canon 40 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. See Canons of Ethics, supra note 94,
Canon 40.
244. Cooling-off periods are common in consumer protection law. See Gardner &
Sheldon, supra note 43, at 261 (1992); Fred S. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the
Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134
U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 113 (1985).
245. See Abramson, supra note 238, at 1.
246. See id
247. See Christensen, supra note 75, at 8-9.
248. See id at 14.
249. See id at 14-15.
250. See id at 15-16.
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unfair effect on small-firm attorneys.251
The Supreme Court essentially affirmed the market approach in Bates
v. State Bar,252 rejecting traditional reasons for banning attorney adver-
tisement.2 53 But the Court also said that states had room to set rules for
different types of consumers in different situations.254 Other commenta-
tors have expanded on this approach, supporting a free-market analysis
but pointing out how different markets should be treated differently. 255
The Supreme Court has also reaffirmed this approach, most recently in
Edenfield v. Fane,56 in which the Court compared accountant solicita-
tion with attorney solicitation.257
The elderly population seems to be just such an individual market.
Seventeen years after Bates, we now have a chance to see whether the
free market has operated as predicted. In the case of the elderly, a bo-
nanza of information has simply not materialized, and the elderly remain
relatively uninformed about lawyers.2 5s One reason offered is that per-
haps a true free market has never operated because the organized bar
maintains some traditional restraints on the release of useful information,
such as ratings of attorneys.259 Another explanation might be that the
free market is indeed operating-to the disadvantage of the elderly. Per-
haps relatively few attorneys view the elderly as a lucrative market, and
as a consequence there has not been enough competition in this field to
produce widespread dissemination of information.26
The extra vulnerability of some members of the elderly to high-pres-
sure selling 261 indicates that it would be unwise to unleash unregulated
attorney seminars on this segment of the public. Therefore, protection of
the elderly would seem to be a sufficient state interest to justify
regulation.
As for the form such regulations should take, many state and federal
consumer-protection regulations, requiring disclosure statements and re-
stricting misleading communications-are now in place to reduce the im-
pact of the very same sales practices outlined in Part I of this Note.262
Such regulations offer a prototype for a new Model Rule for attorney
251. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
252. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
253. See id. at 367-79.
254. See id. at 383-84.
255. See Hazard et al., supra note 89, at 1089-94.
256. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
257. See id. at 1802-03.
258. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
259. See Morton, supra note 74, at 287-89.
260. See e.g., Allyson L. Moore, Demographics Driving the Rise of Elder Law, N.J.L.J.,
July 18, 1991, at 1 (quoting a practitioner on the income-earning potential of elder-law
attorneys: "I'm not saying that you can't make a good living [from elder law], but you
won't be in the million-dollar-a-year club.").
261. See supra notes 19-42 and accompanying text.




solicitation. Adherence to this Rule, as detailed below, need not be oner-
ous. In fact, the Rule should easily be able to satisfy constitutional re-
quirements. First, instead of being a prophylactic ban, the Rule requires
attorneys to take affirmative actions that keep consumers more informed.
Requiring disclosure statements and the like is entirely consistent with
well-settled law involving commercial transactions263 and with existing
law on attorney advertising. For example, the Supreme Court permitted
states to require attorney disclosure statements in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Council.2" More to the point, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the similarities between attorney solicitation and face-to-face
selling.265 Since the Court found a greater potential for abuse in attorney
solicitation,266 the Court would surely approve attorney solicitation rules
modeled on, for example, federal regulations of direct selling of con-
sumer products.267
Finally, voluntary disclosure statements are now commonplace in the
medical community.268 Admittedly, physicians obtain signed informed
consent documents to safeguard themselves from malpractice actions.26 9
Nevertheless, the act of informing the patient does protect the patient.
Similarly, attorneys should be willing to make disclosures to their clients
and take other affirmative steps to avoid the potential for overreaching.
Increasing openness and honesty in the attorney-client relationship ad-
vances the purposes of the rules of professional conduct.
2. A Proposed Model Rule
The proposed Rule incorporates various disclosure requirements in or-
der to provide more information to consumers. Second, the proposed
Rule takes a firm stance against the types of misleading and coercive
salesmanship that are so effective with the elderly2 70 and offers a method
to deter such behavior.
PROPOSED MODEL RULE 7.3A DIRECT CONTACT WITH
PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS AT SEMINARS, CONFERENCES, AND
OTHER PUBLIC GATHERINGS
(a) A lawyer may speak publicly on legal topics. If a lawyer addresses
such speeches to prospective clients known or assumed to need partic-
ular legal services, the communication shall be considered advertising
263. See id at 261; see also Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and
the Regulation ofAdvertising, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 673 (1977) (predicting constitutional-
ity of consumer regulations before their introduction).
264. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
265. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 & n.23 (1978).
266. See id.
267. See iL
268. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 189-91 (5th
ed. 1984).
269. See id.
270. See supra part I.
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subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1. A lawyer may accept employ-
ment resulting from such presentations, subject to the additional re-
quirements below.
(b) If the circumstances of the prospective clients indicate a lack of
sophistication about legal services, the lawyer shall distribute a written
disclosure statement during such presentations, which statement shall
include the following:
(1) a statement that the presentation is an advertisement for the at-
torney's services or those of the attorney's firm;
(2) a short written summary of the contents of the presentation; and
(3) a statement that the potential client may want to consult an-
other attorney.
(c) An attorney may organize a presentation in conjunction with an-
other organization. In such cases, the disclosure statement required by
paragraph (b) shall include a disclaimer of any affiliation with or en-
dorsement by such organization.
(d) A lawyer may meet individually with attendees at any time after
such presentation. The client shall have three business days to rescind,
without penalty, any representation agreement entered into as a result
of any seminar or other live presentation. A lawyer shall present the
client with a written disclosure of this right prior to entering into any
representation agreement.
(e) A videotape recording of a representative presentation shall be
kept as long as the lawyer uses such presentations, along with a record
of when and where such presentations are given.
COMMENT
It is an important goal of the legal profession to educate members of
the public about legal services. Nevertheless, a live presentation by a
trained advocate may present dangers of overreaching with an audi-
ence consisting of unsophisticated or inexperienced prospective clients.
The requirements of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of this Rule are
designed to counter these dangers by alerting the participants to the
true nature of the transaction, the pros and cons of any services of-
fered, and the participants' various legal rights. The requirements of
paragraph (e) of this Rule are designed to facilitate enforcement of this
Rule. The Rule does not require that presentations be subject to re-
view prior to dissemination. Such a requirement would be burdensome
and expensive relative to its possible benefits, and may be of doubtful
constitutionality.
Proposed Rule 7.3A creates a separate category for seminars and other
live public communications, recognizing the hybrid nature of the seminar
presentation. Paragraph (a) clearly establishes that a seminar is advertis-
ing, not impermissible solicitation. At the same time, the rule reminds
attorneys that the seminar format carries some of the dangers of over-
reaching that exist in any in-person contact.
Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) are designed to fill gaps in information
among the elderly and indeed all consumers. Handing out a short writ-
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ten summary of proposed legal services would allow consumers to take
home the paper and reflect on the transaction. The other required disclo-
sures would encourage such reflection.
Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of the Rule would apply only to unsophis-
ticated or inexperienced consumers. Although it appears that under Ed-
enfield v. Fane,27' the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on
professional solicitation, a state could permit provisions such as these to
apply to solicitation of all types of potential clients,2" 2 there is no need to
protect corporate clients, who have experience with attorneys.
Of course, disclosures on paper would probably not be totally effective
in counterbalancing high-pressure sales techniques, which cannot be po-
liced efficiently. Paragraph (e), therefore, requires the attorney to keep a
videotape record of representative seminar presentations to solve the
problem of policing articulated by the Supreme Court in Ohralik and
Edenfield. The requirements of this paragraph are based on the require-
ments of a parallel provision in Model Rule 7.2273 regarding printed and
broadcast communications. This provision holds out the spectre of pos-
sible disciplinary enforcement. When making the recordings, the attor-
neys would consider their mannerisms and their scripts carefully. The
potential for disciplinary action would, it is hoped, deter their varying
their actual performance from the recorded version.
Finally, the proposed Rule requires a cooling-off period. The Michi-
gan State Bar Association, in a recent ethics opinion about seminars and
Rule 7.3,274 suggested that attorneys allow a cooling-off period after sem-
inars before meeting individually with clients but did not establish proce-
dures for doing so. 275 Instead, this Rule requires attorneys to inform
clients in writing of their privilege to sever an attorney-client relation-
ship. It allows a three-day rescission period, which is the typical period
allowed in many consumer transactions.276
Some commentators might criticize these proposals as costly and un-
justified. Professor Fred McChesney, for example, criticizes federal reg-
ulations of funeral sales27 7 and door-to-door sales278 as unjustified by
empirical evidence of need, and points out that they increase consumer
costs.279 Supporters of disclosure and similar consumer protections,
however, recognize that such rules are imperfect and may increase over-
271. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
272. See id at 1802-03. The Court acknowledged that the "sophisticated and exper-
ienced business executives" sought as clients by the accountant would not easily be
swayed by the accountant's pitch. Nevertheless, the Court suggested that it would ap-
prove regulation of attorney selling even to these corporate clients, because of attorney
"training in the art of persuasion." See id
273. See Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 7.2.
274. See supra notes 238-46 and accompanying text.
275. See id
276. See Gardner & Sheldon, supra note 43, at 261.
277. See McChesney, supra note 60, at 4.
278. See McChesney, supra note 244, at 64, 112.
279. See McChesney, supra note 60, at 10.
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all costs slightly. Regulations are imposed despite this knowledge, as a
policy decision, to level the playing field for consumers.280 Ironically,
even Professor McChesney supports cooling-off periods in the regulation
of attorney solicitation.28 '
Compliance with these Rules should not be costly, either. Attorneys
likely already print and distribute business cards or brochures at semi-
nars. Including the elements required in this Rule would be relatively
easy. Even the making of a videotape recording should be well within
the means of small-firm attorneys now that home video cameras are
commonplace.
Of course, amending the Rules as described here would not eliminate
every problem relating to getting the members of the public the informa-
tion they want about attorneys. The organized bar may want to consider
other changes that would help consumers. For example, the bar may
want to do more to encourage or even require attorney involvement in
programs to provide consumers with more information about attorneys
and the law. One study shows that telephone hotlines, staffed by private
attorneys on a rotating basis, can increase services to a wider segment of
the public at low cost.282 A related program could be increasing distribu-
tion of legal publications for consumers2 3 and reforming fee structures
to reduce the difficulty of comparing attorneys.284 Finally, some com-
mentators suggest that the bar should undertake to reveal negative infor-
mation about attorneys who are being disciplined 285 and create formal
specialty certifications-as in the medical profession-to provide an ob-
jective measure of ability that consumers understand.28 6
The need for other reforms is not a reason to delay or avoid changes
such as those proposed in this Note, however. Such changes could help
consumers and improve public perceptions of the bar.
280. See Pitofsky, supra note 263, at 669 ("Market failure in the dissemination of prod-
uct information and the ineffectiveness of possible alternative systems for ensuring truth-
ful and relevant advertising indicate that some form of government regulation of the
advertising process is warranted."); id. at 671 ("[P]rotection of consumers against adver-
tising fraud should not be a broad, theoretical effort to achieve Truth, but rather a practi-
cal enterprise to ensure the existence of reliable data which in turn will facilitate an
effective and reliable competitive market process.").
281. See McChesney, supra note 244, at 113.
282. See Moore, supra note 72, at 823-25.
283. See Coleman, supra note 72, at 469 (recommending community education for the
elderly, including pamphlets, videotapes, handbooks, senior fairs, telephone advice lines,
law day programs and lectures).
284. See e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Solicitation, 36 J. Legal Educ. 317, 330 (1986) (sug-
gesting "graduated fee formulas that bear some relationship to the services performed
and risks assumed").
285. See, e.g., Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and Disclo-
sure Advertising: Towards a New Ethos, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 351, 352 (proposing mandatory
disclosure of attorney misconduct to improve public confidence in the bar).
286. See Coleman, supra note 72, at 475.
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CONCLUSION
The elderly are disadvantaged in consumer transactions and in their
dealings with attorneys. Many attorneys wish to solicit these clients by
seminar, but such seminars do pose a danger of overreaching by attor-
neys. Attorneys should be encouraged to conduct seminars to alleviate
gaps in information. The Model Rules should provide guidance for these
attorneys to prevent them from misleading or coercing their audiences.
Therefore, the rules governing attorney behavior should be amended
with this in mind. The changes should be supplemented by voluntary
efforts of the bar to find new ways to open up legal services to the elderly
and all consumers. These changes would aid the public and enhance the
image of the bar.

